19 Why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War:
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This article is from the Vietnam FAQ, by Brian Ross, John R. Tegtmeier, Edwin E. Moise, Frank Vaughan, John Tegtmeier with numerous contributions by others.
19 Why Australia became involved in the Vietnam War:
The reasons as to why Australia became involved in the
Vietnam War have been traditionally painted in the colours
of "collective security" and as part of the anti-Communist
"crusade" to contain a world wide communist threat.
However, the decision to become involved was not one take
in isolation by the government of the day in Canberra.
Rather it was the culmination of a long period of tension
and unease, not as one might believe, over the idea of
communist expansionism in Asia, but rather because of what
was considered the unsatisfactory relationship which had
developed between Canberra and Washington. The key to that
relationship had been Indonesia and its relations with
Australia over first Dutch West New Guinea (now Irian Jaya)
and then Malaysia. Indeed as Greg Pemberton points out,
"Australia's defence and foreign policy during the post war
period cannot be fully understood without reference to
Indonesia." (1)
In particular there was the problem of Dutch West New
Guinea and Australia's relations with Indonesia. The Labor
government under Chifley in the immediate post-war years
had looked favourably upon Indonesia's claim to self-
determination, reflecting a deep commitment to the Atlantic
Charter of 1941 and also a desire to perhaps displace the
Dutch as the main influence in the archipelago. Indeed
when the Dutch attempted to use force to reassert their
domination of the islands after the war, the Australian
government sided with the new Republic. This annoyed both
Washington and London which desired to see that the
territories to Australia's north should remain in
"friendly" (ie.colonial) hands. This was, according to
Pemberton, "the highpoint of Australian-Indonesian
relations in the post-war world and led Foreign Minister
Dr. Subandria" later to describe Evatt and the Labor
government as the 'mid-wife' of the Indonesian Republic." (2)
This attitude quickly changed when a new Liberal-
Country Party coalition government took office in 1949.
While it shared the same desire as its predecessor to
maintain good relations with the new Republic, its past
history of a vigorous opposition to the perceived threat of
Communism, both at home and now abroad meant that it was
quickly charting a collision course with Indonesia.
The Liberal and Country parties which constituted the
government during this period had created their policy on
this matter while in opposition at the end of the forties.
Many of the conservative politicians who made up these two
parties had been suspicious of the ambitions of the last
Labor Government's Minister for External Affairs,
Dr.H.V.Evatt, while the ideological affinity that was shown
between the ALP and new Indonesian republic had aroused
alarm. The refusal of the Communist dominated Waterside
Worker's Union to load Dutch ships, bound for Indonesia,
during the new republic's struggle for independence had
been important in creating pro-Dutch sentiments amongst the
coalition's leaders. This apparent collusion between the
Indonesians and the Australian Communists was enough cause
for grave suspicion amongst the soon to be elected
opposition leaders, about the new republic's political
alignment. (3)
Menzies could have perhaps overcome earlier
prejudices, had it not been for Australia's perception of
the strategic importance of the island of New Guinea. With
the near run result of 1942 still fresh in their minds,
when the Japanese onslaught had only just been stayed north
of Port Moresby, it was not unusual that the new Liberal
Minister for External Affairs, P.C.Spender would declare
that New Guinea was, "an absolutely essential link in the
chain of Australian defence" and added Australia has, "the
duty of ensuring by every means open to us that in the
island areas immediately adjacent to Australia, in whatever
direction they lie, nothing takes place that can in any way
offer a threat to Australia".(4)
Despite this declaration, it would have been perhaps
logical that the Government would have re-evaluated its
perception of the importance of New Guinea to Australia,
particularly in the light of having just signed the ANZUS
agreement in 1951. Article V of which guarantee the
integrity of both Australia's and New Zealand's Pacific
territories. This would have meant that New Guinea was no
longer essential to Australia as a buffer against a
possibly expansionist Indonesia as Australia's integrity
was now apparently guaranteed.
So for strategic reasons, even if perhaps mistaken,
the Australian government desired a continuing Dutch
presence in West New Guinea. It tried to achieve this by
both cooperation with the Dutch and by lobbying at the
United Nations, in an effort to frustrate Indonesian claims
to the island.
However, neither of these policies was pursued with
any consistency. In November 1957, the Governments of
Australia and the Netherlands declared a policy of close
cooperation in New Guinea since,
"The territories of Netherlands New Guinea, and the
Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea and Papua are
geographically and enthologically related... future
development of their respective populations must
benefit from cooperation in policy and
administration." (5)
This policy of cooperation was actually only minimal
for Australian policy makers knew that this principle of
joint development might prove embarrassing unless it was
certain that Indonesia would not be able to realise her
claims to any part of New Guinea, either by force or by a
Dutch withdrawal.
Throughout the fifties Australia's support for the
Dutch in West New Guinea had rested upon one main
assumption; that both the United States and Britain were
tacitly in favour of a continuing Dutch presence there.
However events were to prove this assumption wrong. The
British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, in a joint press
conference with the Australian Prime Minister, Robert
Menzies, in 1958, said that Britain was only willing to
support Australia's views only on, "the plain of the UN."
(6) Similarly American support was appearing to wane when
both the they, and the British, resumed arms shipments to
Indonesia, despite protests from both the Netherlands and
Australia. (7)
When it was obvious that there was going to be no
guarantee of American support for Australia's stance, the
Government attempted to adopt a less rigid attitude. They
invited the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio, to
Canberra for talks with the Australian Minister for
External Affairs, R.G.Casey. At the end of these talks a
communique was issued that indicated the Australian
Government's willingness to adopt a more passive role if
any agreement was reached between the Netherlands and
Indonesia. (8)
With the issue of this communique the Government came
under attack from many sections of the community,
particularly the press. (9) In the face of this strong
domestic opposition to the idea of Indonesian possession of
West New Guinea, Prime Minister Menzies concluded that it
would be politically disadvantageous, or even suicidal for
him not to continue with the established policy. It should
be remembered that at this time the Government's majority
in the lower house consisted of one seat, and Menzies
always remembered the collapse of his 1941 Government when
a no confidence motion was passed against him.
Pemberton also raises the point that perhaps Menzies's
government never had any real intention of modifying its
real stance over the matter of West New Guinea. He
suggests that these, "events were possibly part of a
deliberate attempt to set up a legal smokescreen which
would obscure Australia's true position." (10) While
stating that Australia would accept any peaceful
settlement, the government could not or would not,
disassociate itself from the Dutch hard line and appear
sympathetic to the Indonesia claim while also appearing
unable to do anything to help them.
However as can be pointed out, this had one unintended
consequence: by adopting a softer line the Australian
government might well have encouraged the Indonesians to
press their claims even harder on the Dutch. In June 1958,
the Indonesian Government gave notice that it was no longer
interested in legal means to settle the dispute, but would
rather now concentrate, "on a contest of power" to resolve
the problem. Australia's seeming intractability, despite
the "new face" which Canberra had assumed over the problem
after the visit of Dr.Subandrio to Canberra, was also
proving to be a great irritant to Jakarta, By late 1961 the
question of a continuing Dutch presence in West New Guinea
had become a burning national issue.
The proceedings at the United Nations General Assembly
session of 1961 left the problem even more confused. The
Dutch Government, sickening of the matter, tried to hand
the problem over to the UN, which refused it. The United
States, and most other nations were obviously unwilling to
support any move that would keep the territory from the
possession of Indonesia, for Dr. Sukarno commanded
considerable influence amongst third world
At the same time India had just ended Portugal's
colonial presence in Goa through the use of force. When
the impotence of the UN to take action was shown, the
attitudes of Indonesia, the Netherlands and the United
States abruptly changed. The day after India's invasion of
Goa, President Sukarno ordered a general mobilisation. (11)
He also sent a letter to President Kennedy warning that
Indonesia would use force if necessary to resolve the
matter. The US Government attempted to head off armed
conflict by trying to get both countries to the conference
table. Kennedy pressed the Dutch to drop their
preconditions to negotiations and made his Government
available as a mediator. (12)
Though the Dutch Government steadfastly refused to
drop its precondition of the principle of self-
determination for the natives of West New Guinea, by the
end of 1961 it seemed that the Dutch had reconciled
themselves to the idea that they would have to bow to
Indonesian military and American diplomatic pressures. (13)
Australia however continued with its hardline policy
towards the problem. With the issue of a stern note to the
Indonesian Ambassador, Menzies made a final effort to press
Indonesia to a settlement without resort to force, and
Australia moved even further from the reality of the
situation. Sukarno's reply showed that his Government was
not impressed by Australia's declarations.
Sir Garfield Barwick, the new Minister for External
Affairs, quickly realised that a continuation of this
policy without backing from America, would leave Australia
open to nothing but ridicule and enmity from its nearest
neighbour. He issued a statement to attempt to defuse the
situation. In it he reversed the earlier strategic
assessment of the importance of West Guinea to Australian
interests. He "saw no evidence whatever of any present
threat to Australia or to any Australian interest." (14)
While helping in calming the situation with Indonesia
to some extent the statement aroused a considerable storm
of protest in some sections of the community. The
Opposition leader, Arthur Calwell, called it, "...abject
appeasement...A betrayal as great as Munich had been." (15)
But what had cause this sudden volte face of
Government policy? Hanno Wiesbrod, (16) suggests that the
Government had received from the Chiefs of Staff a
strategic reassessment of the importance of West New
Guinea, in the light of article V of the ANZUS agreement.
The Military reported that the possession of West New
Guinea by the Indonesians would not be a threat to
Australia because,
1) Indonesia's offensive potential was rated as very
low. It was considered to be difficult, if not
impossible for Indonesia to mount and sustain a large
scale invasion force.
2) The rugged remoteness of the terrain would also be
an inhibiting factor for direct invasion as well as
subversive activities. (Subversive activities were
rated to have only nuisance value.)
3) In the event of a large scale conflict with a
Communist and/or Communist supported Indonesia the
American guarantee under ANZUS would operate. A
repetition of a World War II experience would be
unlikely since the United States had a
preponderance of naval power in the Pacific. (17)
With the Indonesian threat destroyed by their "expert"
advisers the only remaining question facing the Government
was whether or not it was still in Australia's interest to
continue with its opposition to Indonesia's claim.
As American support was lacking, Australia would have
stood alone. Sir Garfield Barwick's argument against the
standing hard line policy, still favoured by his fellow
cabinet members, was that such a move would have been
against the best interests of Australia, and would only
have prolonged the dispute. Since the Australian half of
New Guinea was guaranteed under ANZUS, it appeared
dangerous and short sighted to incur the further enmity of
Indonesia.
With India having set the example in Goa it was only a
matter of time before Indonesia would be in conflict with
the Dutch forces present in Dutch West New Guinea. The
idea of Australia becoming involved in such a conflict
would have been ludicrous, Australia lacked both the
manpower under arms and the weapons to prosecute a conflict
with Indonesia. Australia would also have become isolated
in what would have appeared to be an anti-colonialist
struggle. It would have embarrassed and alienated the US
and would have weakened any claim Australia might have had
on American assistance if eastern New Guinea had been
attacked. While finally for the cabinet members who felt
that Australia would have been letting down the Dutch,
Barwick pointed out that the Dutch had already declared
their willingness to give up their administration of the
territory, at the session of the UN assembly the previous
year.
So it was that Australia quickly bowed out as a major
participant in the dispute. It did however still remain
involved with attempts to get the Indonesians and the Dutch
to negotiate over the matter. After several armed clashes,
usually with the Indonesians coming off second best, an
agreement was reached on 15 August 1962 with the result
that the UN took over administration for a short period.
This quickly ended and Indonesia assumed control of the
western half of the island.
Australia finally gave into the Indonesians on the
matter by justifying it to itself that it was better that
the Indonesians gained the island, than the possibility of
an armed conflict which would, "threaten world peace and
could well bring disaster to South-East Asia by its
encouragement of Communist activity and intervention." (18)
There was also the fear that if the Indonesian government
came under the pressure of promoting a war that the
influence of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) might
become more powerful.
The result of this mishandling of the West New Guinea
affair was most certainly a failure of Australian foreign
policy for the Liberal-Country Party Government of the
period. The Government had not attempted to point out the
realities of the situation to the people, with the result
that the Casey-Subandrio communique issued in 1959, which
would have modified Australian policy in line with the
realities of the situation, was not well received by either
the public or the Opposition. This forced the Government
to continue with its unrealistic policies until forced to
either back them with some form of force or change them.
It was only with the appointment of a new Minister for
External Affairs, that Menzies was wakened to the dangerous
position that his policies had placed the Government in.
Being unable to back this hardline policy with either
Australian or perhaps more importantly, American muscle,
meant that Australia became open to ridicule, particularly
when Indonesia resorted to force.
Indeed Renouf suggests that the failure of Australia's
policy towards West New Guinea had fateful consequences for
her Indonesian relations. "When on 17 August 1963 Sukarno
acclaimed his 'Year of Triumph', he knew that his victims
included Australia." (19) He had achieved his goal by
doing whatever he liked in the teeth of Australia's
opposition. Australia, Indonesia concluded, was no match
for them and, in case of trouble between the two countries,
Indonesia did not have to be unduly preoccupied with the
reactions of Australia's protector, the United States.
This then forced the Government to back down and most
certainly damaged our standing in Indonesian eyes and
contributed to the formulation of a policy of
"confrontation" by Dr. Sukarno as a method by which
Indonesian interests could be furthered.
As we have seen Australia was unable to back its
rhetoric against Indonesian expansion in New Guinea with
force. One of the reasons why she was unable to do so was
because the small Australian Army, which surely numbered
only four Battalions of infantry plus some supporting units
was already committed to other overseas countries, as well
as the defence of the Australian mainland. In April 1955
Menzies had committed one of these Battalions to the
defence of Malaya, where it was stationed as part of the
Strategic Commonwealth Reserve.
After the success of Indonesia's policies in the
matter of West New Guinea, Dr. Sukarno decided to apply
them against the newly formed state of Malaysia, which
consisted of Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo, Singapore and
initially Brunei. Indonesia had at first wished Malaysia
all success but by the end of 1962 Jakarta had changed its
tune. While it admitted it had no territorial claim upon
Malaysia, Subandrio said, Indonesia could not remain
indifferent to its formation because the Federation would
have a common boundary with Indonesia. Just afterwards
Indonesia supported a revolt in Brunei, which while not
connected with the proposal for the Sultanate to join the
new federation, was used as a causus belli for the need for
confrontation on the behalf of the people of North Borneo
by Jakarta.
On 20 January 1963 Subandrio announced "confrontation"
with Malaysia, because Malay was not fully independent but
rather "neo-colonialist". Other Indonesian leaders
explained that Malaysia did not really represent the wishes
of the people of North Borneo, or Sabah as it is now known,
and also Sarawak. (20)
At first only with words, then anti-British and anti-
Malaysian demonstrations and riots, it quickly became a
small scale war with the beginning of the infiltration by
Indonesian troops across the borders of North Borneo.
Britain reacted by ordering its troops into North Borneo to
defend it against Indonesian infiltrators. Australia was
quick to follow, desiring to ensure that Britain remained
tied into guaranteeing the stability of the region. (21)
This left only two Battalions for the defence of mainland
Australia and its widespread territories.
In November 1963, Menzies held a snap election with
defence as the major issue. The items under discussion
were the joint Communications base at North West Cape, the
Fiji procurement decision and the Labor party's proposal of
a Nuclear free Southern Hemisphere. Menzies successfully
argued that Labor's policy on all three represented a
danger to Australia's security. After winning an extra
seven seats in Parliament the Government believed that the
public supported a policy on Forward Defence and by 1965
Australian troops were fighting the Indonesian insurgents
in Sabah and Sarawak.
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